Introduction
Since the early work of pioneers such as Jeffrey Williamson (1974) , Knick Harley (1978 , 1980 , John Hurd (1975) or Jacob Metzer (1974) there has been an explosion of work documenting the integration of national and international commodity markets during the 19th century. Successive papers have advanced the state of our knowledge along several dimensions. A small minority (e.g. O'Rourke and Williamson 1994 , Klovland 2005 ) have documented patterns of price convergence or divergence for commodities other than the grains which have been the focus of most papers. Some authors, notably Karl Gunnar Persson (e.g. Persson 2004) , have demonstrated the importance of comparing commodities of identical qualities in different markets. And during the past decade or so, much more sophisticated econometric procedures have been used to identify both the speed with which commodity prices moved back to equilibrium after a shock, and the trade costs which determined whether such an adjustment process would take place in the first place (e.g.
Ejrnaes and Persson 2000).
Recent work has broadened the scope of these investigations well beyond the late 19th century. David Jacks (2005 Jacks ( , 2006 and Federico and Persson (2007) have established that international commodity markets were becoming better integrated throughout the post-1815 period, and not just after 1870. O'Rourke and Williamson (2002) find no evidence of commodity market integration between continents before 1800, while the evidence provided by Jacks (2004) and Özmucur and Pamuk (2007) for market integration within early modern Europe is decidedly mixed. Meanwhile, international economists have recently started to uncover evidence of international price convergence for a variety of consumer goods during the late 20th century, although this finding is at odds with what little we know about international agricultural markets during the same period (Engel and Rogers 2004 , Goldberg and Verboven 2005 , Parsley and Wei 2002 , O'Rourke 2002 , Federico and Persson 2007 . Strikingly, however, there has been little or no work documenting price convergence or divergence during the interwar period. This is surprising, since the years after 1929 saw a collapse in world trade which has been extensively studied, as well as a rise in protectionism which has also been the subject of much scholarly attention. One of the classic questions which many have asked regarding the period is: can this post-1929 collapse in world trade (documented in Figure 1 ) be attributed to the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 in the United States, and equivalent import restrictions imposed elsewhere, or was it simply a reflection of declining world output? Somewhat embarrassingly for economists to whom policies such as Smoot-Hawley symbolise the folly of interwar economic policy-making, quantitative analyses of the episode have tended to downplay the role of tariffs in explaining the world trade slump, emphasising instead the role of falling demand and output (Irwin 1998 ).
However, Jacob Madsen (2001) argues that discretionary increases in protection were as important as nominal income declines in explaining the post-1929 world trade slump.
Presumably, if trade barriers had contributed to the fall of world trade, then this would have manifested itself in an increase in price gaps between markets, leading (ceteris paribus)
to an increase in import prices, a decline in export prices, and a decline in trade volumes, with the size of all three effects depending upon elasticities of supply and demand. Increasing price gaps is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for protectionism to have had any effects on world trade whatsoever. It thus seems as though the question of what happened to interwar commodity market integration should be of interest not just to scholars of market integration per se, but to those interested in the international economy of the period more generally. And yet, very little work has been done on the subject to date. One exception is Federico and Persson (2007) , who look at world wheat markets over the past two centuries and find (using annual data) that while these were extremely well integrated in the early 1920s, there was a sharp increase in international price variance in the years after 1929. The aim of this paper is to provide more such evidence, using higher-frequency data and more sophisticated techniques, for a greater range of commodities, and to ask: what was the impact of World War I on international commodity markets? To what extent did these recover during the 1920s? Did the years after 1929 see a further disintegration of international commodity markets, and if so, was this disintegration severe enough to leave these markets less well integrated than they had been before 1914? And what were the causes of the disintegration?
Was it due to rising transportation costs, as suggested by Estevadeordal, Frantz and Taylor (2003) , or to policy, or to some combination of the two?
Empirics

Data
The primary source for this study is the International Institute of Agriculture's International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics. Although this publication provides a wealth of information on international commodity markets during the interwar period, it has not yet been exploited by economic historians, as far as we know. The Institute was founded in 1905 and headquartered in Rome. The IIA was a "world clearinghouse for data on crops, prices, and trade to protect the common interests of farmers of all nations." Thus, it was the first international organization dedicated to the task of generating and publicizing world agricultural data. Initially comprising forty nations, membership was extended to 51 by 1913.
It was succeeded in 1945 by the United Nation's Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).
The first statistical Yearbook was produced in 1909 and covered a wide range of statistical material, from land area and population to agricultural production and agricultural prices. After World War I, these volumes were published in subsequent years from 1920 to 1939. Their express purpose was to document the changes in global commodity markets after the First World War. To quote, "the opinion was widely held that world economy [sic] would return to the position existing on the eve of the conflagration so that data for the years immediately preceding the War could be taken in a sense to represent the normal and thus to constitute a good basis of comparison" (International Institute of Agriculture, 1933) .
The data collection efforts of the International Institute of Agriculture were prodigious. They cover 374 weekly commodity price series over 46 commodity classifications in locales as far-flung as Rangoon, Rio de Janeiro, and almost all conceivable commercial ports in between. Of the 374 series, we are able to exactly match 27 commodityspecific city pairs. These range from (Danish, creamery for export) butter in Copenhagen and London to (No. 2 winter, American) wheat in Chicago and Liverpool. The commodity and temporal coverage of our exact matches is documented in Table 1 . We note that the International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics potentially allows for an even larger number of matches. However, we have employed a very conservative selection criterion to ensure that differences in product quality can play no role in our results.
In the International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics, all weekly prices were quoted in local currencies and measurements. Quoted prices in the source country were converted into the currency and measurement of the matched destination country. For instance, (Danish, creamery for export) butter in Copenhagen was quoted in crowns per 100 kilograms and converted into shillings per hundredweight based on standard physical conversion rates and nominal exchange rates derived from the Global Financial Database.
Methodology
Our chief focus is on estimating trade costs-that is, the costs of physically transporting goods across markets inclusive of freight rates, tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade-over the interwar period, with an especial regard to comparing these to conditions prevailing on the eve of the First World War. In recent years, a voluminous literature has emerged in economics and economic history on how to gauge the trade costs separating markets on the basis of price differentials (Balke and Fomby 1997; Obstfeld and Taylor 1997) . For instance, Jacks (2005 Jacks ( , 2006 documents the process of market integration in the context of the Atlantic economy by examining grain price data from over 100 markets in Europe and North America from 1800 to 1913.
In contrast to earlier work which looked mainly at average annual price gaps between markets, the modern literature has relied on methods directly based on or indirectly inspired by the threshold autoregression approach first developed by Tsay (1989) . Here, we adopt the latter approach and make use of an extremely parsimonious model of commodity market integration. The basic idea is that agents-given the prevailing costs of transport, tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, the costs of obtaining credit and contracting in foreign exchange markets, etc.-will exploit all profitable opportunities in terms of price differentials. In this case, the basic arbitrage conditions will always be:
That is, the price in location 1 must be less than or equal to the price in location 2 plus the trade cost associated with moving a given commodity from location 2 to location 1.
Likewise, the price in location 2 must be less than or equal to the price in location 1 plus the trade cost associated with moving a given commodity from location 1 to location 2. Where commodities are known to be moving in one direction only, say from location 1 (the source city) to location 2 (the destination city), this implies that
In this case, the difference in prices for a given commodity and for a given city-pair will follow a basic threshold auto-regression (TAR) process, whereby 4.)
In models of this class, λ is allowed to vary according to whether Coleman (2007) . Given that the IIA reports exact commodity-specific city- 
In this case, the estimated half-life of a shock to the pricing system is 2. That is, in 1913 it took on average about two weeks until the arbitrage trade in butter reduced a pricing deviation above the trade cost estimate between Copenhagen and London by 50 percent.
Thus, from 52 weekly observations on the price margin between two cities for a particular commodity in a particular year, the procedure generates a set of annual estimates of the trade cost separating these markets, as well as the adjustment speed. In what follows, we concentrate on the trade cost estimates for two reasons. First, we are primarily interested in the changes in the costs of doing trade between 1913 and 1939. It is these costs which would have led to international commodity price gaps widening, assuming that this in fact happened, and which would have reflected the impact of rising protectionism. At the same time, there seems little reason to believe that the technology underlying the commodity trade and, thus, determining the speed at which the commodities in our samples were shipped, or prices arbitraged, radically changed in this period. These markets had witnessed the introduction of such innovations as steamships and telegraphs well beforehand. Second, the 1 The inauguration of the Panama Canal in 1914 is an obvious exception to this general statement. However, none of those city pairs for which we have price information in 1913 is likely to have been affected by identification of the threshold parameter comes off the entire set of observations for a given year (generally 52), while the identification of the adjustment parameter comes off the subset of observations that the TAR routine determines to be most likely to be above the trade-cost threshold, resulting in less precision.
2
In any case, most of the estimated coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level, and, as predicted, we always find a negative adjustment parameter  and a positive trade cost TC. We combine these commodity-, city pair-, year-specific estimates of trade costs with information on the average annual prices of the same commodities in destination cities to arrive at a unit-less measure of trade costs which is comparable across commodities and years. Tables 2a and 2b summarize the estimated trade costs as a share of destination market prices for the 291 observations at our disposal.
The first finding which we want to discuss is the comparison between trade cost levels in 1913 versus the post-war period. For the fourteen trade cost series at our disposal with observations both in 1913 and in the post-war period, fully ten register an increase in trade costs as a share of destination market prices. Regarding the four which register a decrease, we note that three of these involved the trade in grains between North American and the United Kingdom (oats between Winnipeg and London, wheat between Winnipeg and London, and wheat between Chicago and London). These three exceptions are less surprising if we consider the staggering heights of commercial activity in these trades-and presumably, investment in the attendant handling and shipping facilities-achieved during World War I (Food Research Institute, various years). Comparing trade costs in 1913 to those in 1922 for those series with available data suggests that, on average, trade costs rose by 60%. The its completion, as a quick review of Table 1 will confirm. We discuss interwar transportation technologies further below.
2 In an exercise to follow, we estimate two TARs on all pre-1930 observations, and all post-1929 observations, for the handful of commodities with sufficient data. These results bear out our expectation that adjustment speeds cannot be distinguished from one another, pre-and post-1929, but that estimates of trade costs can. The cataclysm of the Great Depression and the corresponding fallout in commercial policy changed all of this. The ratio of trade costs in 1933 to trade costs in 1913 is a staggering 2.59-that is, trade costs as a share of destination market prices had increased by almost 160%. Furthermore, apart from some fits and starts in re-establishing some semblance of order to international markets, the ratio still stood at 2.68 in 1938.
Some of these patterns can be detected in (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1995) .
A longer run perspective: international price gaps, 1870-1938
Some authors, such as Giovanni Federico (2008) , prefer to use simpler indicators, such as the average annual price gaps between markets, as a measure of international commodity market integration. In this section we therefore provide this evidence for the interwar period, and compare interwar price gaps with those pertaining in the late 19 th century, so as to gain a longer-run perspective on interwar disintegration. Table 3 gives annual average price gaps for twenty commodity routes between 1913 and 1937. As a sensitivity check, the sample of routes presented here differs slightly from those presented earlier: the selection criterion used here is that monthly data for the commodity in question be provided in the IIA Yearbooks, expressed in both markets in gold francs per quintal. Reassuringly, the same qualitative message emerges from these data as earlier.
example, the New York-Rio coffee price gap rose from 9.8% in 1913 to 15.8% in 1929 and 103.6% in 1933, before declining to a still high 58.2% in 1937. in 1913 to 102% in 1917; the London-Calcutta jute price gap rose from 4.4% to 106.8%, the rapeseed price gap rose from 14% to 140%, the wheat price gap rose from 16% to 118% and the linseed price gap rose from 22% to 217%; the Hull-Bombay cottonseed price gap rose from 40% to 278%; and the London-Rangoon rice price gap increased from 26% to 422%.
Third, those wartime losses were later recouped. And fourth, once this process of post-war recuperation was over, there was no further progress towards commodity market integration, while in the cases of rice, linseed, rapeseed, and US cotton, there was disintegration from the late 1920s onwards, with 1929 appearing as a breakpoint. In the case of the London-Rangoon rice trade, for example, price gaps in the 1930s were back in the 40%-50% range where they had been in 1873. On some routes, the interwar period saw a halt to further integration; on others, it saw a significant erosion of the progress which had been made during 1870-1913.
Sources of disintegration: policy or technology shocks?
One of the questions remaining is the source of this disintegration. The historical literature strongly suggests that any changes in trade costs in the early 1930s were the result of drastic changes in commercial policy. At the same time, the recent work of Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003) Moreover, Estevadeordal et al. point out, citing Hummels (1999) , that what matters for the relative cost of shipping is its TFP growth rate relative to the economy-wide TFP growth rate (since the latter will raise factor prices throughout the economy, and thus raise costs for sectors experiencing below-average productivity growth).
Estevadeordal et al.'s finding that rising real maritime freight rates (from the mid1920s through the end of the 1930s) can help explain the interwar trade bust is based on the Isserlis (1938) maritime freight rate index, which ends in 1936, and which they deflated by the British consumer price index. However, there are at least two reasons why this finding should not be accepted uncritically. The first is that the way in which Isserlis constructed his index has been criticized, for example by Yasuba (1978) who argues that there was an upward bias built into the index based on its choice of routes. The second is that if we are concerned about the impact of freight rates on international trade, we should be deflating them, not by a general consumer price index, but by the prices of the goods being traded.
A more recent paper, by Shah Mohammed and Williamson (2004) , addresses both of these concerns. Shah Mohammed and Williamson collect freight rates for a larger and more representative sample of routes, and deflate by route-specific deflators, based on the prices of the commodities being shipped on those routes. The resulting nominal and real freight rate indices, for the period 1870-1944, are plotted in Figure 5 . As can be seen, despite the wartime improvements in transportation technology mentioned earlier, freight rates shot up after 1914, as a result of higher wages and fuel, and more expensive ships. Transport cost increases are thus prima facie a plausible contender in explaining the wartime disintegration of international commodity markets documented earlier. Nominal freight rates remained higher during the 1920s than they had been before the war, although they fell continuously, and regained pre-war levels briefly in the early 1930s. They then increased as the 1930s progressed, before exploding once more during World War II. trade costs as a proportion of London prices rose by roughly 50% in both instances. 5 The price data used in the previous section experienced gaps in reporting from August to December 1926, and from September to December 1932. That is, the observations for 1926 and 1932 previously presented were estimated over the range of January to July and January to August, respectively. This does not present a problem for estimation in a given year as the only data requirement for the TAR procedure is that the price data is evenly spaced (in this case, weekly) and continuous. However, when estimating over the entire period 1922 to 1929, or 1930 to 1938 , the data need to be augmented so as to fill those gaps with observations from the latter halves of 1926 and 1932. Fortunately, the Food Research Institute's Wheat Studies provides a wealth of data not only on consumption, production, and transactions worldwide, but also on trends in wheat prices in international markets. Combining the two sources, we have continuous weekly time series for these two wheat markets from January 1922 to December 1938. Moreover, the difference is statistically significant across periods. By contrast, while the speed of adjustment parameters do change across regimes, they do so in an inconsistent manner, and the differences are not statistically significant. We take this as prima facie evidence that the communication and transportation technology surrounding trade did not change in this period, but that policy and other barriers to trade almost certainly did.
Is there any other evidence from these particular markets which might guide us on this point? Luckily, the Wheat Studies publication also provides some limited information on prevailing freight rates linking prominent markets in the worldwide wheat trade. In this instance, we are limited to considering the case of the wheat trade between Winnipeg and London. Figure 6 depicts the ratio of the estimated trade costs to the London price, and the ratio of quoted freight rates to the London price. Both ratios start in 1922 at or near their prewar levels of 0.2351 and 0.0787, respectively. As in Table 2b , the trade cost to destination price ratio falls rapidly in the early 1920s, but then remains rather steady up to 1929, when it was 0.1382. From 1929, the trade cost series explodes, reaching a peak in 1932 of 0.2977, and then quickly recedes by the mid-1930s. In contrast, the ratio of freight rates to the destination price declines continuously through the 1920s with an inflection point being reached in 1929. However, the ratio never rises above 0.1000 and is not marked by the dramatic spike surrounding the onset of the Great Depression found in the trade cost series.
Thus, we are left with the proposition that the spikes in the proportionate trade cost series depicted in Figure 3 must have been driven by other processes. Again, the historical literature leads us to believe that commercial policy is a very likely contender. However, future work should also consider the collapse of the gold standard, as well as the likely evaporation of commercial credit in the wake of the Great Depression.
Conclusion
This paper has documented a dramatic wartime disintegration of international commodity markets; a gradual reintegration during the 1920s; and yet another phase of disintegration from 1929 onwards. The post-1929 disintegration was not due to increasing freight costs, unlike the disintegration of the wartime years, and protectionism seems the most likely alternative candidate. On the other hand, an increasing scarcity of trade finance, similar to what is happening today, may also have been playing a role. Another possibility, suggested by Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003) , is that the increase in transaction frictions associated with the collapse of the interwar gold standard may have increased trade costs. On the other hand, the net impact of abandoning gold on trade remains to be seen, given that, as Irwin (1993) points out, countries which maintained monetary orthodoxy were more likely to impose quantitative restrictions on trade than those which abandoned gold.
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